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EDITORS' FOREWORD
"If law is to be understood, language must be also."' Ours is a society
of laws, and laws are merely the products of the words that comprise them.
Or are they? Such is the conundrum that confronts members of our society,
including judges, lawyers, and scholars of all types, as they attempt to
discern the "meaning" of the words and thus of the law.
Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars have been on a quest for the proper
mode by which to discern the meaning of the law presumably as long as
laws have been recorded. Consequently, modes and theories to guide the
interpretation of legal language abound. Francis Lieber, a 19th-century
scholar much discussed during the Conference,2 defined interpretation as
"the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words, that is the sense
which their author intended to convey."3 On its face, then, interpretation
of legal language should be a relatively facile task for native speakers of
the language in which the law is written. However, the reality is quite the
opposite. Words are inexact and imperfect symbols for the communication
of ideas, and such inherent imprecision complicates the expression of the
speaker's intent.4
Legal language has proved particularly difficult to decipher. Anyone
paging through a copy of the United States Code, the Code of Federal
Regulations, or the United States Reporter quickly realizes that regardless
of its origin-legislative, executive, or judicial-the language in which the
law is written is not for the faint of heart. Moreover, it does not seem to
be particularly geared toward the proverbial "average American citizen,"
whoever that might be. The reality appears to be that the language of law
is written by lawyers for lawyers in a lawyer's register. The sad fact is that
1. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 114 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
2. See, e.g., Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 785, 940-53 (1995).
3. FRANCIS LIEBER, PHILOSOPHY OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 11 (1880).
4. See Harry W. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 3 (1939).
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lawyers have as much trouble sailing "amid the sea of indeterminate legal
language"5 as everyone else. Linguistics, to borrow a phrase, at least offers
"a few more stars by which to steer."' 6 This Symposium issue offers but a
glimpse of the astronomical charts that may ultimately derive from the
intersection of law and linguistics. Linguistics, after all, is a social science
dedicated to systematically analyzing the word symbols of an utterance and
describing the logically attributable meanings of that utterance.
The Northwestern University/Washington University Law and Linguistics
Conference represented the first significant interdisciplinary dialogue among
scholars of law and linguistics and addressed itself to a central question:
What is meaning in a legal text? The scholars who gathered in Evanston
six months ago are among the foremost legal and linguistic scholars of our
age, and their discussions clearly reveal the complexities and impediments
that inhere in the quest for one true and systematic mode of interpreting
language, legal language in particular. The Conference is instructive,
however, insofar as it paints a clearer picture of how linguistics, the science
of language, can aid judges, lawyers, and scholars in disambiguating and
otherwise making determinate problematic legal texts.
When the Editorial Board decided to publish the proceedings of the
Conference, we were uncertain as to what would ultimately fesult. We
determined that while the conferees certainly represented a cross-section of
philosophy as to the interpretation of language, the philosophical continuum
in this area was not exhausted. Consequently, we invited commentary from
approximately seventy judges, politicians, and legal and linguistic scholars.
Expecting perhaps ten brief responses, we were overwhelmed by eighteen
responses averaging over twenty pages in length. The result is this issue of
the Washington University Law Quarterly.
It would be inappropriate to fail to acknowledge those without whom this
issue would not have been possible. Our gratitude is extended to Dean
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr. of the Washington University School of Law and Dean
Robert W. Bennett of the Northwestern University School of Law for their
generous support of the Conference. We also thank Dr. Judith Levi and
Professor Clark Cunningham for their assistance in organizing and editing
this issue as well as for their instrumental roles in convening the Confer-
ence. Finally, and most importantly, we thank Teri Doyle, our desktop
publisher, for patience and understanding beyond human comprehension
and for many hours of labor above and beyond the call of duty.
5. Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1264 (1995).
6. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1617
(1994).
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